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OPPOSITION to the principles of unemployment insurance on constitu-
tional and philosophical grounds seems to have subsided to wistful
reminiscing.' Now that the various state systems have been paying bene-
fits, many of them for two years, - the most important problem remaining
is that of studying the operation of these systems with the purpose of
correcting deficiencies which have lately become manifest. This Article
will examine the administrative adjudication of contested claims for
benefits where loss of employment was due to a labor dispute. Though
denial of benefits for connection with a labor dispute is only one of
several grounds for disqualifying claimants who have worked in covered
employment,3 it is the most significant from the point of view of an
immediate and direct effect upon the interests of organized labor.
Of the fifty-one states and territories with unemployment insurance
laws, forty-one copied in most respects the labor dispute disqualification
clause of the Social Security Board Draft Bill,' while the others devised
1 Member of New York Bar.
i-Economist, Bureau of Research and Statistics, New York Division of Placement
and Unemployment Insurance.
1. The decisive blows were dealt by the Supreme Court in Cartmichael v. Southern
Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937) and Stexard Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937).
The case for the opposition is summarized by the dissents of Sutherland, J., in the Car-
incchael case, and of McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler, JJ., in the Dazis case.
2. Benefits first became payable in one state (Wisconsin) in July, 1936; in 22
states, in January, 1938; in 2 states, in April, 1938; in 3 states, in July, 1938; in one
state, in September, 1938; in 2 states, in December, 1938; in IS states, in January, 1939;
and in the last 2 states, in July, 1939.
3. See note 11 infra.
4. "Sec. 5. An individual shall be disqualified for benefits--(d) For any weeh with
respect to which the commissioner finds that his total or partial unemployment is due
to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establish-
ment or other premises at which he is or was last employed: Pr:'idcd, That this sub-
section shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the commissioner that-
(1) He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute
which caused the stoppage of work; and
(2) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, immediately before
commencement of the stoppage, there were members employed at the premises at which
the stoppage occurs, any of whom are participating in or financing or directly interested
in the dispute:
fProvided, That if in any case separate branches of work which are commonly con-
ucted as separate businesses in separate premises, are conducted in separate departments
of the same premises, each such department shall, for the purpose of this subsection, b2
deemed to be a separate factory, establishment, or other premises./ SoctAL Sucvarn.
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their own formulae, either wholly or in part.' The lack of uniformity in
detail should not obscure the principle common to each of the systems:
disqualification of otherwise eligible claimants whose loss of employment
is due to a labor dispute. In elaborating and implementing this principle,
the state laws embody three significant and overlapping variables: the
duration of the disqualification, the character of the labor dispute, and
the demarcation of the claimants involved in the dispute.
The disqualification period is generally for the entire duration of the
stoppage of work; only six acts establish a maximum disqualification
period, and the shortest is three weeks in addition to the normal waiting
period.' With regard to the character of the labor dispute, the great
majority of states recognize no distinction between strikes and lockouts
and make no provision for investigating the merits of the controversy.
Reference is usually made, as in the Draft Bill, to "stoppage of work
which exists because of a labor dispute." Yet, seven statutes seem to
disqualify only for stoppage due to strikes;' and one of these, along
with two other states, allows compensation if the commission, upon
investigation, finds that the labor dispute was the fault of the employer,
either because he violated a collective agreement or a relevant state or
federal law, or because he provoked the strike.8
EMPLOYER RESERVE ACCOUNT TYPES (Rev. ed. Jan. 1937). This provision was bor-
rowed, with only slight alterations, from the one in the British Unemployment Insur-
ance Act, 1935, 25 GEO. V, c. 8, §26-(1). For a list of states following this bill, see
APPENDIX, infra p. 491.
5. Alabama [§ 6B(a)], California [§ 56(a)], Delaware [§ 5(d)], District of Colum-
bia [§ 10(a) (6)], Kentucky [§ 9(b) (4)], New York [§ 504.2(b)], Ohio [9 6c], Penn-
sylvania [§ 401(e)], Utah 1§ 5d], Wisconsin [§ 108.04(5) (a)].
6. Alaska [§ 5 (d)] (8 weeks); Louisiana [ 4 (d)] (10 weeks) ; New York
[N 504.2 (b)] (10 weeks) ; Pennsylvania [§ 401 (e)] (3 weeks in addition to normal
waiting period) ; Rhode Island [§ 7 (4)] (8 weeks in addition to normal waiting period);
Tennessee [§ 5 (d)] (four weeks).
7. California [9 56(a)] ("if he left his work because of a trade dispute") ; Colorado
[§ 5 (d)] ("strike"); Kentucky [§ 9 (b) (4)] ("strike or other bona fide labor dis-
pute" . . . "provided that for the purposes of this subsection a lock-out shall not be
deemed a strike or a bona fide labor dispute and no worker shall be denied benefits by
reason of a lock-out") ; Ohio [§ 6c] ("strike") ; Pennsylvania [§ 401 (e)] ("voluntary
suspension of work resulting from an industrial dispute") ; Utah [§ Sd] ("strike");
District of Columbia [§ 10 (6)] ("strike or jurisdictional labor dispute"). However,
California interprets its provision to include lock-out ("left his work" means "unem-
ployed due to"; Unemployment Reserves Comm., May 3, 1938). And both Colorado and
Pennsylvania intend to handle lockouts on the same basis as strikes. Communications
from L. A. West, Chief of Benefit and Claims Section, Colorado Dep't Unempl. Comp.
and Empl. Serv. (Dec. 5, 1939) ; and C. R. Davis, Special Deputy Att'y-Gen'l, Pa. Unempl.
Comp. Bd. Rev. (Dec. 4, 1939).
8. Arizona [§ 5 (4)] (failure or refusal of employer to conform "to the provisions
of any agreement or contract between employer and employee and any law of the State
of Arizona or of the United States pertaining to hours, wages, or other conditions of
work") ; Montana [§ 5 (d)] (failure or refusal of employer to conform "to the provi-
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Most important of these variables, in terms of numbers affected, is
the delineation of those engaged in the proscribed activity. The forty-
one statutes following the Draft Bill relieve a claimant from disquali-
fication if neither he, nor any member of his grade or class of workers
in the establishment, is participating in, financing or directly interested
in the dispute.' However, the remaining ten states disqualify all claimants
who have lost their employment by reason of a labor dispute."'
Several reasons have recurrently been offered to justify disqualifica-
tion for loss of employment due to a labor dispute. Most popular tradi-
tionally has been the argument that unemployment insurance schemes
are intended to insure only against involuntary unemployment.,1 Loss
of employment due to a labor dispute is "voluntary" and therefore
beyond the pale. A second argument balks at the thought of permitting
the state to take an "unneutral" position in industrial relations by
"financing" a labor dispute through unemployment insurance benefits.' 2
Coupled with this idea is a reluctance to lend any encouragement to
strikes.3 And finally, some feel that it would be an ethical impropriety
sions of any law of the State of Montana [which has no labor relations act] or of the
United States pertaining to collective bargaining, hours, v.-ages or other conditions of
work"); Utah [§ 5d] (failure or refusal of employer to conform "to the provisions of
any law of the state of Utah or of the United States pertaining to hours, wages, or other
conditions of work;" finding "that the employer, his agent, or representative, has con-
spired, planned, or agreed with any of his workers, their agents, or representatives to
foment a strike").
9. See note 4 su pra.
10. See note 5 supra. In these states, disqualification ensues even if the claimant, or
any member of his grade or class, is not participating in, financing, or directly interested
in the labor dispute.
11. See, for example, Declaration of State Public Policy in the Social Security Board
Draft Bills (supra note 4), which has been followed by most of the states: ". . . the
public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of this state require the enactment
of this measure . . . for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be
used for the benefit of persons wicnployed through no fault of their ow:!' (Italics sup-
plied). The principle of compensation for involuntary unemployment only, is further
expressed in all laws but Pennsylvania's by the disqualification of claimants discharged
for wilful misconduct; and in all but the New York law, for voluntary quitting without
good cause. Similarly, disqualification ensues under every statute if the claimant is not
ready, willing and able to accept suitable employment.
12. "The provisions of Sec. 5042 (b) of the Unemployment Insurance Lax, are in the
nature of an assurance to the people of the state that the state ill not participate, inso-
far as the provisions of this act may apply, in any industrial controversy during the first
ten weeks thereof." New York, Appeal Board, 907-39 (Aug. 29, 1939). "The object
of the [labor dispute] disqualifying provision is to prevent unemployment benefits from
becoming an aid in financing a labor dispute . . ." Mich. Unempl. Comp. Comm., Deci-
sion on Chrysler Case, November 10, 1939. See also Maryland Unempl. Comp. Bd., Dec.
No. 17 (1939); South Carolina, Unempl. Comp. Comm. Gen'l Counsel, Legal No. 85
(Oct. 21, 1938); SociAL SEcunrY IN AmxERIC.A (Soc. SEc. PUmL. No. 20, prepared by
President's Committee on Economic Security, 1937) 125.
13. N. Y. Times, April 27, 1935, p. 16, col. 3.
1940]
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to subsidize strikers with funds derived from contributions made by
employers.
14
If these are the arguments that have persuaded, "seductive cliches"
have indeed prevailed over logic. A closer examination of the problem
will reveal that the basis for this type of discrimination is by no means
as convincing as it may at first blush appear. The "involuntary" argu-
ment is practically self-demolishing. Even if the assumption be made
that compensation should be confined to those who have lost their em-
ployment "involuntarily," we are left with no explanation for the dis-
qualification of workers who are locked out by their employer, 18 or who
are not directly involved in the strike which caused their loss of em-
ployment." More basically, it is unfortunate to apply willy-nilly to
strikers an understandable objection to compensating malingerers.
Though strikes are admittedly "voluntary" in so far as they involve a
deliberate cessation of work by the employees, they are, unfortunately
perhaps, necessary concomitants of an effective bargaining process which
will achieve and maintain adequate wages, hours and working conditions.
In fact, the experience of England demonstrates that even where in-
dustrial relations have become more stabilized, and peaceful collective
bargaining the established practice, the strike remains an essential weapon
of last resort to an active labor movement. To penalize strikers because
they left their work "voluntarily" is to accept the anachronistic notion
that strikes are essentially economic wastes engineered by irresponsible
leaders to victimize the employer or to enable workers to enjoy a vaca-
tion from their jobs. Also, by ignoring the merits of the dispute, the
state may often penalize employees for attempting to achieve the aims
to which enlightened social legislation has pointed.' 8 Furthermore, the
"involuntary" argument is particularly unrealistic in states where merit
rating systems provide the employer with an incentive to instigate a
dispute whenever it is necessary to lay off a substantial number of
employees.'
9
14. See discussion in Schindler, Collective Bargaining and Unemployment Insurance
Legislation (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 858, 872. There are, moreover, employee contribu-
tions of 1% in Alabama, California, Kentucky and New Jersey; of 0.5% in Louisiana;
and of 1.5% in Rhode Island.
15. See p. 479 infra.
16. See note 5 supra; p. 486 infra.
17. See RErORT OF COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN (sub-
mitted to Secretary of Labor, Aug. 25, 1938) 189 and Appendix E (strike statistics);
REPORT OF COMMISSION ON INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SWEDEN (submitted to Secretary
of Labor, Sept. 19, 1938) f 40.
18. E.g., maximum hours, minimum wages, decent working conditions, collective
bargaining.
19. Thirty-eight laws include provision for variation of the tax rate according to
some measure of the employer's benefit experience. The usual measure is the relation
between benefits drawn and contributions paid.
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In view of the recognized public policy of equalizing bargaining power
between employers and employees, it seems illogical to insist that "neu-
trality" requires nonpayment of benefits.20 Since the employer is usually
capable of greater endurance than his workers, a strictly neutral state
would merely be adjusting the unequal balance if it made generous
immediate payments. At any rate, whatever may be the merits of
this theoretical argument, the state could not with justice be accused
of "financing" a labor dispute if, after the average waiting period of
three weeks, 21 it paid striking workers approximately three to eighteen
dollars22 weekly for an average maximum period of sixteen weeks.2
And any danger that this would stimulate strikes is precluded by the
preliminary waiting period and the small amount of benefits in com-
parison to the regular wages.
Finally, in answer to the argument that it would be unfair to subsi-
dize strikes by employer-paid payroll taxes, the prevailing opinion among
economists is that payroll taxes are either shifted forward to the con-
sumer in the form of higher prices, or back to the workers in the form of
lowered wages or sacrifice of potential wage increases. -4
It is not to lament their practical historical impotence that these weighty
counter arguments are emphasized. Rather is it to indicate that at very
best the scales are but infinitesimally tipped in favor of disqualification
for unemployment attributable to a labor dispute. Hence, if the experience
of the past two years shows that administrative application has been
cumbersome or inequitable, this type of disqualification is not worth
retaining and ought to be removed.
Two major industrial controversies within the past year have drama-
tized the difficulties confronting administrators and the profound con-
sequences of their decisions. The first was the bituminous coal nego-
tiations; the second, the recent Chrysler controversy.
20. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (Supp. 1933). Sce Magruder, A Hall
Century of Legal Influence Upon the Development of Collective Bargaining (1937) 50
H~Av. L. REV. 1071.
21. All 51 laws provide for a waiting period before benefits are payable for total
unemployment. For a detailed analysis of its duration, see SOCIAL SEcURITY BOAnD, CoM-
PASisoN oF STATs UNEPLOy-mENTr Co-PFNsToN; L.-ws (Aug. 1, 1933) 69-71.
22. All laws limit the maximum weekly benefit amount, usually to $15.00. Five states
do not, however, provide any minimum amount. See id. 59-60.
23. See id. at 61-63.
24. The present system of financing is "merely the taling of contributions from
poor Paul for impoverished Peter." EPsTEiN, IzsECURiTy: A Cu,==.s;ou TO AnmpacA
(1938) 723; BURNs, TowARD SocLL SEcurITY (1936) 157-161; STEWa,T, SOCIAL SZ-
cmuRIv (1937) 161; Brown, The Incidence of Compulsory In'urance of forkmen (1922)
30 J. PoL. Ecox. 76; Yoder, Some Economic Implications of Unemployment Insurance
(1931) 45 Q. J. EcoN. 622. In addition, there is direct taxation on workers' earnings
in six states. See note 14 supra.
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Following the termination of the two-year joint agreement between
the coal operators and the United Mine Workers of America on March
31, 1939, there was a stoppage of work at mines throughout the coun-
try.25 Neither a strike nor a lockout was declared. The union had proposed
on two occasions that the operation of the mines continue pending the
conclusion of a new agreement, but its proposal had been rejected."0
Except in a few areas, there were no disturbances, and no attempts
were made to picket.2 7 Provision was made for maintaining the property
in a working condition and for supplying coal to hospitals, churches,
schools and dairies.28 During the protracted negotiations, most of the
401,000 miners, scattered through fifteen states, were idle from six to
fifteen weeks. 9 When the state unemployment compensation agencies
were faced with thousands of claims filed by the miners, and the problem
of determining whether their claims should be disallowed on the ground
of a labor dispute, the same set of facts produced a bewildering array
of ratiocination. At the present writing, with appeals still pending in
many states, the miners' claims have been allowed in six states and dis-
allowed in nine."0
Typical of the confusion has been the vacillation in Tennessee. In
making the initial determination, the Tennessee Commissioner of Labor
referred to the express legislative policy to compensate for "involuntary
unemployment" and to provide benefits for persons "unemployed through
no fault of their own," and concluded that the miners' unemployment
was "due to the lack of suitable employment being available to them
through no fault of their own and not because of a labor dispute." He
emphasized that peaceful negotiations were being carried on in accord
25. (1939) 49 MONTELY LAB. REv. 691.
26. N. Y. Times, April 1, 1939, p. 7, col. 1.
27. Most of the decisions mentioned this. See, e.g., Md. Unempl. Comp. Bd., Memo-
randum of Findings and Determination re Claims Filed by Unemployed Coal Miners of
Md., May 2, 1939. There were both violence and picketing in Kentucky. Unempl. Comp.
Comm. Dec. of Special Agent, May, 1939. In Ohio there were instances of violence at
nonunion mines but none at union mines because no attempt was made to operate. Rul-
ing of Administrator, Ohio Bureau Unempl. Comp., May 9, 1939.
28. N. Y. Times, April 3, 1939, p. 2, col. 2; (1939) 49 MONTHLY LAD. REv. 694.
29. Id. at 695 et seq.
30. Benefits were allowed in Iowa (Comm. Dec. No. 39c-61, July 26, 1939]; Kansas
[Comm. Dec. No. 28, cited C. C. H. Unempl. Ins. Serv. (Kans.) 8058.10] ; Pennsylvania
[(1939) 49 MONTHLY LAB. Ray. 696]; Tennessee [(1939) 50 UNIT MINE WORKERS J.
No. 23, p. 18]; Maryland (infra note 32) ; Ohio [Bd. Rev. Doc. No. 727, Aug. 29, aff'd,
Ct. Common Pleas, Dec. 26, 1939.] Disallowed: Alabama, Colorado, Michigan, Utah,
Wyoming [all in (1939) 49 MONTHLY LAB,. Ray. 696]; Indiana [App. Trib., 39-LD-31,
39-LD-38, 39-LD-43 (1939)]; Kentucky [Unempl. Comp. Comm. Dec. of Spec. Agent,
May, 1939]; Virginia [Unempl. Comp. Comm. June 19, 1939]; West Virginia (Dec. Tr.
Examiner, Sept. 26, 1939].
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with the express provisions of the National Labor Relations Act." A
similar line of reasoning was followed by the Maryland Unemployment
Compensation Board 2 and by one member of the Alabama Appeal
Board."
The Tennessee Commissioner of Labor was overruled by the Board
of Review.3" Brushing aside the Commissioner's contention that the
negotiations had been conducted under the "law of the land," the Board
emphasized the proposals, the rejections, the counterproposals and the
inability to reach an agreement. Although it recognized that there was
neither a strike nor a lockout, the Board declared that the negotiations
as such were a labor dispute. The dissenting member of the Board denied
that a labor dispute could exist when negotiations were continuing.3 A
court decision later reversed the Tennessee Board on yet another ground.
The court found that for the purposes of the Unemployment Insurance
Law, the employer-employee relationship had terminated with the con-
tract on March 31, and that no labor dispute could exist in the absence
of that relationship.3"
The recent Chrysler-UAW (CIO) controversy provided another
instance of the uncertain operation of labor dispute disqualification
clauses. On October 6, 1939, the Dodge plant was closed, and 11,000
workers were sent home.37 Work at the ten other Chrysler plants soon
came to a standstill, and for over fifty days, about 50,000 Chrysler
workers were idle.' The Michigan law disqualifies individuals for the
period during which their unemployment arises from a labor dispute
actively in progress, unless they were not participating in, financing or
directly interested in the dispute.30 Two opposing contentions were ad-
vanced as to qualification for benefits under this clause. The employer
alleged that the plants were closed because of a slowdown strike by
31. In re Claimants Unemployed Because of Expiration of Appalachian Agreement
on March 31, 1939. (Undated mimeographed memorandum of Tenn. Commissioner of
Labor).
32. Md. Unempl. Comp. Bd., Memorandum of Findings and Determination re Claims
Filed by Unemployed Coal Miners of Maryland, May 2, 1939. "The stoppage of work was
due to the refusal of the operators to agree to the resolution proposed by the representa-
fives of the miners." Id. at 16.
33. Dissenting opinion of J. A. Lipscomb, Member of Board of Appeals, Alabama
Unempl. Comp. Comm. Decision No. 1, May 20, 1939.
34. Block Coal & Coke Co. v. District 19, U. 11. W. A., No. 39-BR-6, Tenn. Bd.
Rev., 'May 19, 1939.
35. Dissenting memorandum of R. 0. Ross, Block Coal & Coke Co. v. District 19,
U. M. "W. A., No. 39-BR-6, May 19, 1939.
36. 50 U r 11l -z WoaRmas J., No. 23, December 1, 1939, at 18. (Judge Brayn).
37. N. Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1939, p. 11, col. 4.
38. Id., Nov. 30, 1939, p. 16, cal. 1.
39. Section 29 (d).
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104 key men in the Dodge plant.4" The union denied a slowdown, coun-
tered with a charge that the assembly line had been speeded up to a
rate which was humanly impossible to maintain, and accused the company
of having locked out the men. 4' As in the bituminous coal situation,
contracts and negotiations complicated the problem. A few days before
the old agreement was to expire, the union had refused the company's
request that it be extended for thirty days, but the union was willing
and did continue to work pending the conclusion of a new agreement.42
Six days later the slowdown incident occurred; the 104 men were dis-
charged, and the operation of the remaining plants was made impossible.
Three days later negotiations for a new contract commenced. In a brief
decision devoted mainly to reciting the facts, the Michigan Unemployment
Compensation Commission disqualified all the workers.43 The decision on
appeal must take account of two possible interpretations of the facts.
The situation may be regarded as a labor dispute, with initiative taken
either by the company through a lockout or by the union through spon-
sorship of a slowdown. Or, emphasis on the fact that the employees had
continued working and that negotiations were in the offing would lead
to the conclusion that there was no labor dispute and the action of the
104 men constituted misconduct. This would subject them to a dis-
qualification period of from three to nine weeks before they would be
entitled to benefits. But they would not be disqualified for an indefinite
period, as under the labor dispute provision, and the remainder of the
unemployed workers would be eligible for benefits after the normal
waiting period."
These two publicized situations highlight the host of issues arising in
a routine manner, but admitting of no routine treatment. What is a
dispute? What criteria are available for determining whether a "labor
dispute" exists? What constitutes "stoppage of work?" When is it
"caused" by a labor dispute? And when does it terminate? When are
claimants not participating in, financing or directly interested in a labor
dispute? How determine "grade or class of workers?"
To understand the significance of this broad range of problems fraught
with important practical consequences, it is helpful first to have some
idea of the process of adjudicating specific cases.45 A deputy of the
administrative agency ordinarily decides in the first instance whether
40. N. Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1939, p. 1, col. 2.
41. N. Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1939, p. 16, col. 3.
42. Id., Oct. 26, 1939, p. 16, col. 4.
43. Mich. Unempl. Comp. Comm. Resolution, Nov. 10, 1939.
44. MICHIGAN UNEMPL. CoMP. LAW § 29(a).
45. SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA-
TION LAWS (Aug. 1, 1938) 88-90. See WHITE, ADMINISTERING UNEMPLOYMENT COM-
PENSATION (U. of Chi. Soc. Serv. Monographs, June, 1939) 266 et seq.; Cloe, Dispiued
Claims Procedure Under the New York Unemployment Isurance Law (1939) 39 Cot.. L.
REv. 1151.
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the claim for benefits should be allowed. But each state law is further
required by the terms of the Social Security Act to provide an
"opportunity for a fair hearing, before an impartial tribunal, for all
individuals whose claims for unemployment compensation are denied.""0
While the method of satisfying this condition varies from state to state,
three successive appellate stages are generally available to the claimant
or to an interested employer.47 Appeal may first be taken to a referee
or to a three-member tribunal consisting of a salaried examiner and one
representative each of employers and employees. This may be followed
by review, either by the administrative agency itself or by an entirely
independent three-member board appointed by the governor. Wide lati-
tude in getting at the facts with the gTeatest speed and informality is
permitted. Appeal procedure need not "conform to common law or
statutory rules of evidence and other technical rules of procedure."' s
Departures from customary legal practice are allowed in such matters
as burden of proof, admissibility of testimony, use of hearsay as evi-
dence, and character of records that may be admitted. And finally,
unlike Great Britain where the court of last resort is an administrative
tribunal,4" the third stage is judicial review. The findings of fact by
the review board are considered conclusive, and the court is, technically,
limited to questions of law.
We may now examine how this elaborate machinery has attempted
to formulate meaningful definitions and to solve specific issues.
NATURE OF A DISPUTE
Before determining whether a labor dispute exists, and whether it
caused the loss of employment, it is necessary to have a workable defini-
tion of the nature of a dispute. If the labor dispute disqualification
clauses were to be interpreted as loosely as possible, benefits would be
denied to all claimants whose loss of employment was traceable to a
disagreement with their employers over terms and conditions of em-
ployment. But no state has gone this far. The word "dispute" or "con-
troversy" is recognized as having a more restricted meaning. The best
definition is the statement of the British Umpire that a dispute implies
the insistence by one party on the acceptance or abrogation of some con-
dition of employment, and resistance by the other party."o How helpful
is this principle in concrete cases?
46. SOCIAL SEcuRrry AcT, §303(a) (3).
47. Unions may not appeal in their own name. However, they may and often do
provide claimants with the assistance of an attorney or other qualified person at hearings.
48. Section 6(f) of the Social Security Board Draft Bills, supra note 4, which is
generally copied in state laws. See, c.g., N. Y. UNEPLOY MT T I;sUrA:,ce LAw § 533.2.
49. Unemployment Insurance Act, 1935, 25 GEo. V, c. 8, § 44 (6).
50. SELECTED DEcISIONS Gnr-v BY THE U tpm REspEc'rin CL.AiS TO BENFIr AND
DONATION PRIOR TO ArRIL 19, 1928 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1929)
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Some loss of employment situations are obviously excluded by the
definition. The clearest cases are those involving voluntary quitting by
employees in the absence of negotiations or demands by either side.
Employees may consider their working conditions so intolerable that
they simply give up their jobs. 1 Or there may be a concerted voluntary
leaving because of dissatisfaction, but no occasion to present demands
because of the absence of an authorized representative of the employer
to receive them; hence no opposing force. 2 Similarly, employees have
not been disqualified where they quit of their own accord rather than
cross a picket line before another establishment, without having made
any demand on the employer not to deal with that customer. 3 And un-
employment may be due to a decision, amicably arrived at by the em-
ployer and his employees, to suspend operations.5 4
When demands are made by one or both of the parties, it becomes
more difficult to determine when disagreement has become sufficiently
aggravated to be considered a "dispute." Two California "hot cargo"
cases, decided within one day of each other, illustrate how tenuous the
distinction may be. In both cases, the employer closed the plant. In
one, it was because his employees, the claimants, refused to pass a picket
line to unload a "hot car" which had been loaded by employees in a
strike-bound warehouse. This was held to be a dispute because it was
said to involve "a positive and affirmative act on the part of the employer,
e.g., the closing down of the plant . . . where the other party to the
dispute, i.e., the employer, has refused to meet the employees' demands." 15
In the other case, the employer had shut his plant in accordance with the
policy of his association because of the refusal of the union in the field
to handle the "hot cargo." There was said to be no dispute because the
employer had not made any demands that his employees handle the "hot
cargo." 50
cases 2103 (p. 203), 6781 (p. 429), 1282/25 (p. 644). See, e.g., Alabama App. Trib.
Dec. No. 4 (Dec. 19, 1938) ; N. Y. App. Bd., 274-38 and 275-38 (Oct. 19, 1938).
51. Pa. Bd. Rev., B-44-8-A-1259, April 4, 1939; N. Y. Referee's Dec. 575-34-38R,
July 6, 1938, and 531-100-38R, Sept. 13, 1938.
52. N. J. Bd. Rev., BR-40L (1939). Cf. Iowa App. Trib. Dec. No. 39A-536-C (Sept.
26, 1939) (not dispute, but voluntary leaving without good cause).
53. N. Y. App. Bd., 274-38 and 275-38, Oct. 19, 1938.
54. As in a New York case, where a unionized blouse shop turned to work on non-
union dresses when the blouse season ended. After two weeks' trial, the employees found
that their earnings at the non-union rate were too low and a temporary suspension of
operations was mutually agreed upon. Referee's Dec. 525-78-38R (July 22, 1938); , ce
also N. Y. Referee's Dec. 531-192-39R (Sept. 8, 1939) ; N. J. Bd, Rev., BR-104L, 1051,
(Aug. 21, 1939); Rhea Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm. of Wisconsin, C. C. H. Unempl.
Ins. Serv. (Wis.) 8121 (Wis. Sup. Ct., May 9, 1939).
55. Cal. Ref. Trib. R-71-157-38, Dec. 31, 1938. See id. R-47-76-38, R-46-83-38 (1938).
56. Cal. Ref.. Trib. R-54-120-38, Dec. 30, 1938, subsequently aff'd in, Cal. Unempl.
Res. Comm. No. 15, March 3, 1939. In Great Britain, where the statutory definition of
trade dispute stipulates "any dispute between employers and employees . . . whether
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Another distinction lies in the nature of the demand. According to
the definition, there must be insistence. This would exclude a purely
exploratory offer, e.g., a mere inquiry by the employer as to whether the
employees would accept a wage cut so as to make it worth his while to
remain in business despite adverse economic conditions, followed by a
negative reply." On the other hand, it is not necessary that either side
press its demands to the full extent of its resources, or that a strike be
authorized or supported by the union. s Although there is generally con-
certed action, overt action by a single person may constitute a dispute.-9
The area of greatest uncertainty, however, centers about the question
of peaceful negotiations. Although the British Umpire's principle implies
the presence of negotiations during a dispute, negotiations per se do not
constitute a dispute.60 Conversely, the absence of negotiations is not
conclusive evidence that there is no dispute; for it may simply indicate
that conferences had broken down or that the respective positions were
known and recognized to be irreconcilable."' Yet it is particularly im-
portant to distinguish between the normal process of collective bargaining
and an industrial dispute. The Labor Relations Acts were passed for
the declared purposes of encouraging the "friendly adjustment of in-
dustrial disputes" and of eliminating "forms of industrial strife and
unrest" which result from the refusal of employers to accept the
procedure of collective bargaining. 2  It is a contradiction of these
employees in the employment of the employer with whom the dispute arises or not" [Act
of 1935, § 113(1) (u)], a sympathetic lockout was deemed to be a trade dispute. SEL.ncrm
DECISIONS, Op. cit. supra note 50, cases 437 (p. 92) and 5117 (p. 364). And in view of the
clause in the Norris Act definition (infra note 71) "regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee," the British ruling
would seem to be applicable here.
57. Ore.: Dec. of Referee No. 38-RA-178 (July 11, 1933).
58. Conn.: Decision of Comm'r No. 177-C-38, Dec. 23, 1938; A. Va. Bd. Rev.,
Dec. of Examiner, No. AT-13, Aug. 9, 1938.
59. N. Y. App. Bd., 577-39 (April 3, 1939).
60. SEL.crz DECISIONS, op. cit. supra note 50, cases 1557 and 1553, (p. 163). See
also Alab. Bd. App. Dec. No. 2 (June 8, 1939) (expressed willingness of employer to
negotiate with U. 31. IV. during nation wide stoppage regarded as evidence of no dispute
in that mine; shutdown caused rather by need of making repairs). Pesnell v. Dep't of
Industrial Relations, C. C. . Unempl. Ins. Serv. (Ala.) f 072 (Alabama C. C. Jeff.
Cty., July 22, 1939); Wis.: Dec. of Indus. Comm., No. 37-C-64 (Oct. 1937) (demand
by employees and refusal by employer found to be of bargaining character and, with no
attendant overt action by either side, not a labor dispute). Peaceful negotiations vwere
held not a dispute in the following cases: Calif. Ref. Dec. No. R-42-85-33 (Dec. 17,
1938); Florida: App. Tribunal Dec. No. 37 (June 15, 1939); N. Y. Referee's Dec. No.
510-146-38R (July 8, 1938).
61. E.g., an employer's refusal to negotiate, or bargain collectively vith the repre-
sentatives of his employees, may in itself be the subject of a dispute. Kans.: Dec. of
Comm'r, Nos. 70-115 (Nov. 24, 1939) ; N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-SL (1939).
62. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 151 (Supp. 1938). "The theory of the Act is
that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely
1940]
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purposes to fail to narrow the concept of a "dispute" so as to exclude
peacefully conducted negotiations unaccompanied by picketing or boycotts.
But the dividing line is in fact hard to draw. Assume, for instance,
that the termination date of a collective agreement is approaching
and negotiations for a new agreement are pending. It is not unusual
for the employer, in order to avoid being left with unfinished work in
the event of a discontinuance of negotiations, to refuse further orders
and lay off his employees as the work on hand is completed. The nego-
tiations pending at the time of the layoff due to the employer's election
not to accept further orders do not constitute a labor dispute and the
loss of employment resulting therefrom is compensable.03  However,
where negotiations are deadlocked and employees are laid off despite
.i the fact that there is sufficient work on hand to maintain complete opera-
tions, an industrial controversy exists although the old agreement may
still be in effect. 4 This distinction may be of special practical significance
in unionized seasonal industries. 5 When the slack season approaches,
the employer's bargaining power increases, and he sacrifices little by
closing down during the course of negotiation. And in the merit rating
states there is a strong temptation, when economic conditions dictate
curtailment of operations, for employers to use inability to reach an
agreement as a pretext for the charge of labor dispute."0
Viewed against this background, the bituminous miners' situation
appears to have led most of the commissions astray. The stoppage con-
tinued, it is true, because the opposing forces were unable to adjust their
differences, and the differences reiated to terms and conditions of em-
ployment. But, as pointed out above,17 the negotiations were generally
unaccompanied by overt hostile acts, such as lockouts, strikes or boycotts.
The parties merely disagreed as to terms but were continuing to bargain
in accordance with the declared public policy. The proper disposition of
this situation, therefore, should have been to compensate the claimants
to promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which
the Act in itself does not attempt to compel." Hughes, C. J., in National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 45 (1937). To same effect, see
Jeffery-DeWitt Insulator Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 91 F. (2d) 134, 139
(C. C. A. 4th, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 731 (1937).
63. N. J. Unempl. Comp. Comm. Bd. Rev. BR-14L (Oct. 16, 1939); N. Y. App. Bd.
649-39 (April 20, 1939) ; Wis. Dec. of Ind. Comm. No. 37-C-64 (Oct., 1937).
64. N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-16 L (1939); N. Y. App. Bd., 822-39 (May 19, 1939).
65. Although there is special provision in twenty-five laws for the establishment of
regulations excluding seasonal workers from benefits during the off-season, only nine
had taken action toward enforcement as of September, 1939. These states have all con-
fined seasonal determinations to such obviously short-season industries as canning; Ore-
gon, however, has applied the provision to the ladies' garment industry.
66. See p. 464 supra.
67. See p. 466 supra.
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on the ground that there was no dispute as that word is used in the dis-
qualification clause.
On the other hand, the Chrysler situation does not so clearly fit into
this category. An argument that there was no dispute when the loss
of employment occurred would emphasize that, according to the com-
pany's position, there was no lockout, and that no strike was declared
by the union until over a month later."s There was not as yet the oppo-
sition of forces characteristic of a dispute, for the union continued to
work after the e-xpiration of the old agreement, and negotiations had
been provided for, but had not yet commenced. The slowdown, if such
it was, constituted an act of misconduct." However, the position that
a dispute existed probably accords more with the background of the
situation. By refusing to extend the old agreement, the union had rejected
a proposal. The company was already aware of the union's demands
for a union shop, wage increases, a voice in the setting of the rate of
production, improved grievance machinery, etc. The company already
knew that these were unwelcome demands, and so did the union. There-
fore, the slowdown, if authorized by the union, or the lockout - either
would constitute a labor dispute- was simply a form of economic
coercion to enable the side using it to come to the conference room with
increased bargaining power. Although it preceded negotiations. it was
a dispute just as surely as a strike following a break off in the negotia-
tions would have been a dispute. 0
NATURE OF A LABOR DISPUTE
Having determined that a dispute exists, the administrative machinery
must next decide whether it is a labor dispute. This term has a familiar
ring. It is readily associated with the Norris-LaGuardia Act and its state
counterparts. Because "labor dispute" is defined at length in anti-injunc-
tion legislation, and not in unemployment insurance legislation,71 there
68. N. Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1939, p. 6, col. 1.
69. In Rhode Island [Deputy's Dec. No. 4-D (1939)], claimants who "sat dowm" in
protest against an increased work load and were fired, in a period when a new system of
work assignment was under negotiation, were disqualified under the misconduct provision
and not because of a labor dispute.
70. See statement by Herman Weckler, vice-president of Chrysler Corporation: "It
is a demonstration of power to compel concessions in the contract negotiations soon to t2
entered into by the union and the corporation." N. Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1939, p. 11, col. 4.
In another 'Michigan case, a claimant who did not report to work upon instructions from
his union, during a period in which negotiations for a new contract were being carried
on, was disqualified. Ref. Dec. Doc. No. 1549 (Mich. 1939) ; to the same effect, see Ind.
App. Trib. 39-LD-21 (1939).
71. "(c) . . . 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or condi-
tions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in nego-
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was some tendency to adopt that definition" even before the United
States Employment Service issued a ruling which will probably turn
out to be definitive.7 3
Public employment services are forbidden to refer applicants to jobs
vacant because of a "labor dispute."74 Similarly, the Social Security Act
requires, as a condition for obtaining the benefits of the federal tax-
offset provisions, that claimants will not be disqualified from receipt of
benefits if they refuse jobs vacant due to a "labor dispute,""l and all
state laws have such provisions.76 The United States Employment Service
ruled, on June 9, 1939, that for the purpose of the provision barring
referrals to establishments where there is a labor dispute, "the term
labor dispute shall include any controversy concerning terms or condi-
tions of employment or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment regardless of whether or not
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and em-
ployee." 77 This definition is identical with that contained in the Norris-
tiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of cm-
ployment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee." 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 113 (1934). State legisla-
tion is similar. See, e.g., N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 876-a, subd. 10 (c) (adds "or any other
controversy arising out of the respective interests of employer and employee"). The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act copies the Norris Act definition almost verbatim, 49 STAT.
450 (1935), 29 U. S. C. § 152(9) (Supp. 1938).
Only Alabama defines labor dispute in its Unemployment Insurance Law. § 6B (a)
incorporates the Norris-LaGuardia Act definition.
72. See Ind. App. Trib., 39-LD-49 (Sept. 19, 1939); N. Y. App. Bd., 21-38 (May
18, 1938); Wis. App. Trib. No. 37-A-19 (1937). The Minnesota Appeal Tribunal, in a
memorandum attached to Case No. 117 (Dec. 6, 1938) stated, however: "We do not
believe that this definition, broad in nature and which might include therein a lock-out,
can be considered for the purposes of the Unemployment Compensation Law. The pur-
pose of the Injunction Law is remedial in nature. Its purpose is to put labor on a parity
with business organizations under certain conditions . . ." References have also been
made to the similar definitions in the National and relevant State Labor Relations Acts:
Pa. Referee's Dec. 44-4-B-54 and 44-4-B-75 (Nov. 1, 1938); Tenn. Bd. Rev. 39-BR-6
(May 19, 1939). Maryland, like Minnesota, has also refused to accept such a definition:
"The individual and personal character of [the Unemployment Compensation Law] . . .
and the clear collective and group type of the other [Labor Relations Act] made the term
'labor dispute' not interchangeable in the two connections." Md. Unempl. Comp. Bd., Dec.
re Coal Miners' Claims (May 2, 1939).
73. See note 77 infra.
74. See note 77 infra.
75. INT. REV. CODE § 1603 (a) (5).
76. Most of the states have, in fact, copied the required provision word for word.
77. Ruling amending § 14 of the "Rules and Regulations relating to the cooperation
of the United States Employment Service and States in establishing and maintaining a




LaGuardia Act,7 and similar to those contained in state anti-injunction
laws." To use different definitions of labor dispute for the purposes
of placement policy and the disqualification of claimants for insurance
would probably be impracticable, particularly since the state employment
services and unemployment compensation agencies are coordinated ad-
ministratively in almost every instance.80
Yet there has resulted what seems to be a curious anomaly. On the
one hand, organized labor, which campaigned for enactment of anti-
injunction legislation, struggles to broaden that definition of labor dis-
pute, since the advantages of the legislation become operative only when
a labor dispute exists."' Contrariwise, the same groups have sought to
narrow the scope of labor dispute in disqualification clauses. s2 The in-
consistency can easily be justified. The purpose of anti-injunction legis-
lation, as has so often been pointed out, 3 is to lessen the abuses resulting
from injunctions in industrial disputes. By expanding the term "labor
dispute," the maximum protection is attained. However, since the pur-
pose of unemployment insurance is to provide compensation for loss of
employment, any disqualifications, such as for labor disputes, should
be strictly construed. This calls for a narrow interpretation of labor
dispute in the field of unemployment insurance. Thus, in allowing the
claims of the bituminous miners, Maryland admitted that the situation
was embraced within the federal and state anti-injunction statutes, but
held that the definition of "labor dispute" was not interchangeable."'
(1) Ordinariy Employee Demands
There is no difficulty under any definition in identifying a labor dis-
pute when employees take some affirmative action to enforce demands
78. See note 71 supra.
79. See note 71 supra.
80. SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYM !ENT COMPES:;SATIO:
LAWs (August 1, 1938) 91-92.
81. See Comment (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1136.
82. Brief on Behalf of Claimants, Members of International Fur Workers Union,
before N. J. Bd. Rev. (1939) 9: "It is submitted that under our Statute the dispute
which disqualifies must be between employer and employce. A dispute between persons
who did not stand toward each other in the relation of cmployer and cmployee at the
time of the dispute, could hardly be the sort of dispute contemplated by the statute as a
disqualification for benefits."
83. See generally FRANKFURMr AxD GnuE, THE LAron INW3rco:: (1930);
Simpson, Fifty Years of Av4wrican Equilty (1936) 50 I1R%,. L IE%: 171, 193 et seq. It
should be noted that the definition of labor dispute in the Norris-LaGuardia Act is
specifically said to be "WNhen used in this Act, and for the purposes of this Act . .
Nopms-LAGuvnIA Act § 13.
84. See note 72 supra.
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concerning wages, hours, working conditions," seniority rights,80 repre-
sentation8 1 or a closed shop. 8  And, once identified as a labor dispute,
its merits are generally disregarded. The employer may be depressing
the wage level with substandard wages and hours. He may be attempting
to enforce wage cuts or to employ scab labor in violation of an agree-
ment. He may have refused to abide by the ruling of an arbitrator. Or he
may have failed or refused to bargain collectively with the representatives
of the majority of the workers as provided in Section 8(5) of the
National Labor Relations Act. All such considerations are irrelevant, 9
except in the handful of states which inquire into the merits of the
dispute. ° One state has, however, without any specific provision, fol-
lowed the British precedent of refusing to disqualify for strikes against
violation of minimum wage laws.9 ' The issue has not yet been presented
85. See, e.g., Alab. Dec. of Unempl. Comp. Comm. Appeal Cases Nos. 4 and 5 (Jan.
5, 1939) ; Ind. App. Trib., 39-LD-16, 39-LD-39 (1939) ; Mass. Bd. Rev. 39-A-127 (July
19, 1939) ; Mich. Referee's Dec., Appeal Docket Nos. AB 697 (Jan. 13, 1939) and AB 782
(Feb. 17, 1939); Minn. App. Trib. Nos. 81 and 82 (Aug. 31, 1938); N. J. Bd. of Rev.
BR-50L and BR-84 L (1939).
86. Calif.: Referee's Trib., R-24-65-38 and R-23-69-38 (Oct. 24, 1938); Ind. App.
Trib. 39-LD-13, 39-LD-15, and 39-LD-17 (1939).
87. Mich. Referee's Dec., App. Docket Nos. AB-888 (April 12, 1939) and AB-1148
(April 27, 1939) ; N. J., Bd. Rev. BR-22 L (1939).
88. Mass. Dep't App. No. 39-R-1 (Feb. 2, 1939).
89. The New Jersey Board of Review stated that individuals who voluntarily absent
themselves from work in order to conduct a strike cannot be regarded as being involun-
tarily unemployed although they may be justified in their action and their purpose may
be socially desirable. BR-65L (1939). Conn.: 4 MONTHLY BULL. OF PLACEMENT AND
UNEMPL. ComP. Div. No. 3, p. 10 (March, 1939); Dec. of Commissioner, No. 358-A-38
(June 21, 1938) and No. 38-A-39 (May 12, 1939). Florida: Ind. Comm. No. 37 (June
15, 1939). Ind.: App. Trib., 39-LD-8 (April 8, 1939). Ky.: Ref. -App. No. 50 (June 5,
1939). Mass.: Dep't of App., 39-R-1 (Feb. 2, 1939). N. J.: Bd. Rev. BR-80L (1939).
N. Y.: App. Bd., 237-38, 238-38, 239-38, 240-38, 241-38, 255-38 (Oct, 6, 1938). N. D. Op.
of Att'y Gen'l, Oct. 21, 1939, C. C. H. Unempl. Ins. Serv. (N. D.) 1 8038, reconsidering
Op. of July 24, 1939 ( 8031); Ohio Bd. Rev. Doc. No. 911 (1939). W. Va.: Bd, Rev.
No. 12 (June 29, 1938). Wis. App. Trib., Dec. No. 38-A-336 (1938).
But see Md. Unempl. Comp. Bd., Dec. No. 17 (1939) 17: "We cannot but conclude
that under the Maryland Act where the covered employee is presumptively entitled to
receive benefits and the Board must find that the stoppage exists because of labor dis-
pute to disqualify him that the Board's finding should not be based on the mere percep-
tion of the presence of the characteristic conditions that are usually present in a labor
dispute . . . The Board considers that its duty under the Maryland Act is to ascertain
the facts and to inquire and determine whether or not the stoppage that here exists is
because of a labor dispute, which . . . will disqualify the claimant, or whether the stop-
page is because of the conduct on the part of the Employer or others which does not make
the consequent labor dispute the cause of the existing stoppage."
90. See note 8 supra. Without specific statutory authorization: Ind. Bd. Rev. No. 39-
LDR-6 (Nov. 1, 1939) (employer breached written contract).
91. SELECrED DECISIONS, Op. cit. .spra note 50, case No. 2358, (p. 211) ; R. I. Deputy's
Dec. No. 6 (Jan. 20, 1939).
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elsewhere, but, if similar rulings follow, it will be interesting to observe
the justifications offered for distinguishing infractions of minimum
wage laws from violations of collective bargaining laws.
(2) Secondary Boycotts
Only two states, Indiana9 2 and Michigan," specifically include sym-
pathetic strikes in their disqualification clause. But the general problem
of whether a labor dispute exists in "secondary boycotts" is not nearly
so complicated as when that issue arises in the courts. There it is usually
a primary or intermediate.employer who applies for an injunction against
strikes, picketing, unfair lists and circulars directed against its services
or products." But for the purposes of determining eligibility for un-
employment insurance benefits, it is important to determine whether a
labor dispute exists only when there has been loss of employment. This
can occur in three types of cases. Loss of employment may be due to
boycott activities directed by others against the employer. Clearly no
labor dispute as between employer and claimant is involved, but loss of
employment may be due to a labor dispute if court precedents treating
such a secondary boycott as a labor dispute are followed." Relief for
claimants must then be sought in the "establishment" and "directly in-
terested" clauses, discussed later." Secondly, employees may walk out in
a sympathy strike or refuse to work on "unfair" materials. And thirdly,
they may refuse to pass a picket line placed around their employer's
establishment by other workers desiring their support. In either of these
two latter situations, a labor dispute is said to exist between employer
and claimants."7 This is also the clear import of the anti-injunction
definition. 95
(3) Rival Unions
The so-called "rival union" situation may arise in an establishment
either when two or more unions are actively competing for recognition,
exclusive or partial, or when a union with few or no members there
demands of the employer that the employed persons be compelled to
92. Section 6 (f) (3) (iii).
93. Section 29(d) (3).
94. See Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes (193S) 47 YA.E L. J. 341.
95. E.g., Levering & Garrigues Co. v. MAorrin, 71 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934),
cert. denied, 293 U. S. 594 (1934). See Hellerstein, op. cit. supra note 94.
96. See p. 486 infra.
97. Sympathetic strike: Wis. App. Trib., Dec. No. 3S-A-336 (June, 1938). Refusal
to work on "unfair" materials: Calif. Referee's Trib., R-71-157-33 (DCe. 31, 1933);
N. J. Bd. Rev., BR-56 L and BR-0 L (1939). Refusal to cross a picket line: N. J. Ed.
Rev., BR-13 L (1939).
98. Hellerstein, op. cit. supra note 94, at 359.
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join the union or that they be replaced by union members. The appli-
cability of the anti-injunction definition of "labor dispute" to this type
of situation turns mainly on the effect given to the clause "regardless of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee."' 00 The Supreme Court has conclusively decided that the
activities of the proselytizing union against a non-union establishment
constitute a labor dispute.' With respect to genuine inter-union rivalry,
however, no explicit decision has as yet been made, though the Supreme
Court's recent affirmance of the Fur Workers case seems definitely to
indicate that it is to be deemed a labor dispute. 10 2
Since only one jurisdiction specifically includes "jurisdictional" disputes
in the labor dispute disqualification clause,' 0 3 it is necessary to consider
whether these precedents should be applied to unemployment insurance
cases. If so, some harsh results may follow.
Many rival union situations have already been submitted for adjudi-
cation under the disqualifying provisions of the unemployment com-
pensation laws, and almost without exception a labor dispute has been
found. Persons unemployed because of picketing by a union attempting
to organize an establishment, in which it has no members, have been
disqualified ;104 picketing of a factory by a minority union, where a rival
union had been certified as exclusive bargaining agent by the National
Labor Relations Board, was deemed to be a labor dispute;1°3 company
union men unemployed because of picketing by an independent union
.have not been allowed benefits ;... and unemployment due to the employer's
99. On rival unions generally, see Jaffe, Inter-Union Disputes i, Search of a Forumo
(1940) 49 YALE L. J. 424.
100. See note 71 supra.
101. Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937); Lauf v. Shinner
& Co., 303 U. S. 323 (1938).
102. Fur Workers Union No. 21238 et al. v. Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72 et al.,
U. S. Sup. Ct., 7 U. S. L. W=Ix 701 (Dec. 11, 1939), aff'g, 28 F. Supp. (C. C. D. C.
1939); Grace Co. v. Williams, 96 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); Houston & North
Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Local Union No. 886, etc., 24 F. Supp. 619 (W. D.
Okla. 1938). Contra: United Elec. Coal Co. v. Rice, 80 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935),
cert. denied, 297 U. S. 714 (1936), (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1320.
103. DrsmcTR OF COLUMBIA UNEMPL. INS. LAW § 10 (a) (6).
104. N. Y. Referee's Dec., 533-76-39R (Aug. 16, 1939).
105. N. Y. Referee's Dec. 531-80-38R (Aug. 2, 1938); N. Y. App. Ed. 198-38 (Aug.
25, 1938). But see Ind. App. Trib. 39-LD-51 (Nov. 21, 1939) (plant forced to close down
by picketing of minority union, but employer prevented from dealing with that union
because had just signed closed shop contract with union representing majority of his
employees; held, not a dispute in active progress). Analogous problems under anti-
injunction legislation are discussed in (1939) 48 YALE L. 3. 1053.
106. Mich. Referee's Dec. No. AB-888 (April 12, 1939). In one case, however, pick-
eting by an independent union of a mine dominated by a company union did not serve to
disqualify the company union members because they were deemed to be nonparticipants
in a dispute existing only between the independent union and the employer. W. Va. Bd.
Rev. No. 82 (Dec. 6, 1938).
[Vol. 49 - 461
19401 UNEMPLO YMENT COMPEN\SATION
action in closing down an establishment, to avoid trouble brewing between
two unions, was held to be non-compensable.' Similarly, when a change
of affiliation of woodworkers from the AFL to the CIO resulted in the
shutdown of plants in Oregon for lack of raw materials because of a
nationwide boycott instituted by the AFL, the woodworkers were dis-
qualified.' In other cases, a change of affiliation of employees from
one national labor organization to the other has sometimes led the former
to charter a new local. The new paper organization gains a closed shop,
and the employees are locked out. In most cases disqualification has been
imposed;... in one it has been avoided through the device of holding
the terms of the closed shop contract tantamount to a discharge of all
members of a rival union."10
(4) Lockouts
Only nine state statutes refer in the disqualifying provisions, directly
or inferentially, to a lockout; seven, for the purpose of exclusion,"' and
two for the purpose of inclusion."12  Where the issue has arisen in the
remainder of the states, a lockout has been deemed a labor dispute in
every instance except one." 3 Maryland has quixotically declared that
unemployment due to a lockout is involuntary and therefore, pursuant to
the purposes expressed in unemployment insurance legislation, com-
pensable.114
107. Wis. App. Trib., No. 39-A-161 (May, 1939); N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-85 L and
BR-86 L (1939).
108. Ore. Referee's Dec. No. 38-RA-108 (March 25, 193S).
109. Ore. Referee's Dec. Nos. 38-RA-114 (April 8, 1938,) and 38-RA-128 (April 2,
1938) (union picketed against lockout); Dec. Unempl. Comp. Comm. No. 39-C-5 (April
19, 1939); Texas: Dec. of Unempl. Comp. Comm., No. 2 (Oct. 1, 1938) (dispute b2-
tween two unions as to which should have right to collective bargaining and preferential
employment is labor dispute).
110. Ore.: Referee's Dec. No. 39-RA-27 (Mard 27, 1939) (no overt action taken
by union).
111. See note 7 supra.
112. ARiz. UNMtPL Comp. LA w § 5 (4) ("labor dispute, strike or lockout"); N. Y.
UN-EmPL. INs. LAW § 504.2 (b) ("strike, lockout, or other industrial controversy").
113. Conn.: 4 MoNTHLY BuLL OF PLACEMENT AND UNEAlPL. Compt. Div. No. 6, at 8
(1939), Dec. of Comm., No. 38-A-39 (May 12, 1939). Florida: App. Trib., Dec. No. 37
(June 15, 1939). Ind.: App. Trib., 39-LD-6, 7, 9, 10, 11 (1939). Minn. App. Trib., No. 56
(March 2, 1939). Miss. Bd. Rev. 1-BR-39 (March 28, 1939). N. J. Bd. Rev., BR-14L
(1939). N. Y. App. Bd. 822-39 (May 19, 1939); Ref. Dec. 524-9-39R (Feb. 7, 1939).
Ore. Ref. Dec. 38-RA-128 (April 28, 1938).
114. Md. Unempl. Comp. Bd., Dec. No. 17 (1939). See N. Y. J. Commerce, October
10, 1939, p. 1, col. 2, where it is feared that "if a lockout is generally held not to consti-
tute a labor dispute, workers affected by lockouts will be eligible for unemployment com-
pensation. This wvill not only reduce the effectiveness of the lockout as an instrument of
labor relations policy, but Will encourage unions to resort to slowdowns and similar tac-
tics to force employers to precipitate a lockout."
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For an agency already overburdened with the complexities of the
American system of benefit payments and not equipped to handle ticklish
questions in the field of industrial relations, the administrative difficulties
of distinguishing in each case between a strike and a lockout would be
enormous. The encroachment of the unemployment insurance agency
on the territory of the National Labor Relations Board, which would
often consider the identical lockout in the guise of an unfair labor prac-
tice," 5 would involve not only a duplication of effort but possible con-
tradictory findings. On the whole, the experience of the seven states with
statutory exclusions of lockouts is unenlightening.110 Kentucky's, how-
ever, indicates how the legislative intent can be evaded. The statute in
unmistakable language excludes from disqualification loss of employment
due to lockouts." 7 In the bituminous coal case, lockout was defined as
"a cessation of the furnishing of work by one or more 'subject employers'
to their 'covered employees' in order to get for the 'subject employer or
employers' more desirable terms than then existed in the unit and estab-
lishment . . .""' Then the possibility of a lockout was excluded on
the ground that since the coal operators merely wanted to continue under
the same conditions, they were not attempting to get "more desirable"
terms."19
Whatever may be said for the administrative convenience of not bother-
ing to distinguish between a strike and a lockout, the result is to enhance
the bargaining power of the employer. For when negotiations are not
progressing to his advantage and it is evident that the union is not
disposed to resort to a strike, he may threaten a lockout. This would
not only deprive his employees of the means of earning a livelihood, but
would render them ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. For
example, in the Chrysler situation, the union vigorously denied that it
had called a strike or that it had engaged in a slowdown strike, but
claimed that its members had been locked out. 2° Legally, this had no
effect on the result, for the Unemployment Compensation Commission
refused to distinguish between a strike and a lockout.' 2' But if the union's
115. See it re American France Line et at., 3 NLRB 64, 77, 79, 80 (1937).
116. See note 7 supra. No cases involving a distinction between strikes and lockouts
have arisen yet in Colorado, District of Columbia and Utah.
117. Section 9 (b) (4).
118. Decision of Special Agent, Ky. Unempl. Comp. Comm. (May, 1939). The defini-
tion quoted follows closely the famous one in Iron Molders Union v. Allis Chalmers Co,,
166 Fed. 45, 52 (C. C. A. 7th, 1908).
119. "In the instant case there are no facts which would tend to show that the eni-
ployers are attempting to get more desirable terms than have previously existed, since
they are willing to sign a 2-year contract under the same conditions as the previous con-
tract." Decision of Special Agent, supra note 118.
120. See p. 468 supra.




charge was accurate, the company was responsible for having turned
a disagreement into a labor dispute, and yet the employees were penalized
by being deprived of unemployment insurance benefits.
We arrive, then, at this unfortunate result. If no distinction is recog-
nized between a strike and a lockout, employers may add another weapon
to their arsenal. On the other hand, if an attempt is made to recognize
a distinction, the administrative machinery will be severely burdened in
applying its vague criteria. The results of the adjudicated cases have,
it seems, amply justified the skeptical prophesies of an earlier commentator
on this subject."
(5) Union Mezbership
Thus far attention has been focused upon cases involving largely the
loss of employment by groups of workers. Other cases arise under the
labor dispute clauses involving the employment or non-employment of
individual persons. In this more amorphous area, decisions interpreting
anti-injunction statutes are neither help nor hindrance, for they seldom
deal with those situations. The administrative adjudications on this sub-
ject may be divided into two groups, those involving discharge because
of refusal to give up membership in a union, and those involving discharge
because of non-membership in a union.
Under the first type, it seems clear that discharge for union member-
ship does not constitute a labor dispute." This is in contrast to the
ruling of the British Umpire who, while conceding rather begrudgingly
that "perhaps he (the claimant) should not be forced to leave his trade
union," found that the insistence of the employer and the resistance of
the employee constituted a dispute "connected with conditions of em-
ployment."' 124 Since there is usually no opportunity for such claimants
to be rehired by their dismissing employer, as there ordinarily is in a
labor dispute, it would be unusually harsh to treat such a case as a labor
dispute. Furthermore, it would condone what is generally regarded as
reprehensible conduct on the part of the employer. All states are agreed,
however, that a strike over the firing of an individual constitutes a labor
dispute.125
In Great Britain, a non-union worker in an open shop was disqualified
for quitting when threatened with violence by fellow workers if he did
122. See Schindler, Collective Bargaiining and Unemployment Insurance Legislation
(1938) 38 COL. L. REV. 858, 881.
123. N. Y. App. Bd., 21-38 (May 18, 1938) and 414-38 (Jan. 17, 1939) ; Kan. Comm.
Case No. C-15-27 (Feb. 18, 1939).
124. SEixzcmm DECisioNs, op. cit. supra note 50, case 1232/25, at 644.
125. N. C.: Unempl. Comp. Comm. Dec. No. 5 (July 26, 1938); N. J. Bd. of Rev.,
BR-25L and BR-57L (1939); N. Y.: App. Bd., 237-38, 239-38, 239-38, 240-33, 241-33
and 255-38 (Oct. 6, 1938).
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not join their union, since a dispute between employees may be a labor
dispute. 2 ' But only one state has thus far disqualified a claimant under
similar circumstances. 27 In other jurisdictions a distinction has been
drawn between an open shop and a closed shop situation, and refusal
to join a union has led to disqualification only when the union has
a closed shop contract. 2  Justification is found in the fact that the
principle of collective bargaining is now a basic public policy, and the
closed shop is an effective outgrowth of this process. Hence a rugged
individualist's refusal to adapt himself to these conditions may be con-
strued as either a labor dispute with his fellow employees, voluntary
leaving or misconduct'
29
A more complicated situation arises when a claimant refuses, because
he is a member of a rival union, to join a union which has obtained a
closed shop contract. Here, too, there is the same reluctance to disqualify
for refusal to join a union, and the prevailing approach is to treat this
situation as tantamount to a discharge of all the employees who were
members of the rival union at the time the closed shop contract was
signed.'8 0
Wisconsin has held that even religious tenets are an insufficient excuse
for refusal to join a union.'' But the general tendency in the states is
toward a policy of hands-off; benefits are allowed to those whose dis-
charge is due to refusal to give up membership in a union132 and equally
to those who are discharged because of non-membership.18 3
In sharp contrast to Wisconsin's cavalier treatment of the claimant
with religious scruples, most of the states have refused even to disqualify
claimants who at one time belonged to the union but who were suspended
126. SELECTEI DEcIsIoNs, op. cit. supra note 50, case 439/1911, at 8.
127. Wis. App. Trib., 38-A-52 (Jan., 1938) and 38-A-274 (May, 1938); Wis. Ind.
Comm. Dec. No. 38-C-23 (1938).
128. Texas: Unempl. Comp. Comm., Appeal No. 13 (Feb. 18, 1939); Mo. App. Trlb.,
AR-87 (1939).
129. See Mo. App. Trib., AR-87 (1939) ("The principle of collective bargaining has
been well established and accepted as public policy by the Congress of the United States
and the State of Missouri . . . 'All Union' or 'Closed Shop' agreements are a further-
ance of collective bargaining and are consonant with such public policy"). Wis. Ind.
Comm. No. 38-C-11 (Feb., 1938) ("Personal conceptions as to the propriety of collective
bargaining agreements cannot be held to prevail over specific expressions of public policy.
The employer's rule requiring membership in the union was reasonable . . ."); see also
Pa. Bd. Rev. No. B-44-4-RM-96 (Aug. 11, 1939).
130. Cal. Unempl. Res. Comm., Rules and Regulations Section, Code B 1356a-04
(1939); N. Y. Referee's Dec. M12-12-38 R (May 9, 1938); Ore. Ref. Dec. No. 39-RA-27
(March 27, 1939). See also Pa. Ref. Dec. 44-6-RH-242 (Oct. 11, 1939) (despite dyna-
miting of his home, claimant refused to give up membership in United Mine Workers
and join the Progressive Miners, as required by his employer).
131. Ind. Comm. No. 38-C-11 (Feb., 1938).
132. See note 123 supra.
133. See note 130 supra; note 134 infra.
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for disciplinary purposes or for non-payment of dues. Discharge of the
claimants may have been induced by a strike of the other employees who
refused to work with the culprits, but in most of the states even this
situation was found not to involve a labor dispute.1 34 Only one state has
inquired, as did the Umpire in Great Britain, whether the claimant's
lapse in payment of dues was due to financial stringency or to a negli-
gent attitude toward both his union and his job, since he would be aware
that suspension from the union in a closed shop would be followed by
discharge."'
Complicated though these definitional problems may be, the task of
the administrator has usually just begun when he has determined that a
situation involves a "labor dispute." The typical statute, it will be recalled,
refers to loss of employment due to a stoppage of work which exists
because of a labor dispute.' Thus the administrator is confronted with
the perplexing problem of deciding (1) whether there is a stoppage of
work, and (2) whether there is a sufficiently direct causal relationship
between the claimant's loss of employment and the labor dispute.
STOPPAGE Or WORK
The teclmical meaning of the term "stoppage of work," as used in
disqualification clauses, is a substantial curtailment of work in an estab-
lishment, not the cessation of work by the claimant or claimants.27 Thus,
134. Ind. App. Trib. 39-A-345 (1939) (nonpayment of dues); Iowa App. Trib.
No. 39-A-564-CH (1939) (same); Mo. App. Trib. AR-45 (benefits allowed to claim-
ant in arrears in payment of dues who was laid off because of a strike of the other em-
ployees) and AR-124 (1939) (benefits allowed to claimant discharged because of pres-
sure on employer by union because of nonpayment of dues); N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-10 L
(1939) (discharge of worker for protesting to employer against fine levied on him by his
union; not due to labor dispute) ; N. Y. Referee's Dec. No. 532-10-39 R (Jan. 18, 1939);
N. Y. App. Bd. 541-39 (Feb. 25, 1939) (disciplinary suspension from union not miscon-
duct); Pa. Bd. Rev. B-44-8-D-217 (March 23, 1939); Pa. Ref. Dec. 44-4-RII-112 (June
30, 1939) (under voluntary leaving clause). Contra: \V. Va. Bd. Rev. App. Case No. 20
(Sept., 1938) (discharge of claimant suspended from the union for calling an unauthor-
ized strike held to be due to labor dispute). Cf. C. C. H. Unempl. Ins. Serv. (Ohio)
806626.
135. SELxcrxn DczsIoNs, op. cit. supra note 50, case 636 (p. 109) ; Ind. App. Trib.
39-14-417 (June 13, 1939) (claimants' failure to pay dues constituted voluntary leaving
of employment, because claimants were bound as members by by-laws which provided for
expulsion for dues arrears and because union acted as their agents in negotiating closed
shop contract which made continuance of membership in union a condition of employment).
136. See note 4 supra.
137. C. C. H. Unempl. Ins. Serv. (Conn. 1939) l 8026.05; Ind. App. Trib. 39-LD-12
(1939); N. C. Deputy's Dec. No. 13 (Jan. 6, 1939); In the matter of Francis J. Mur-
nane, Claimant, Claim No. 7975 v. State Unemployment Compensation Commission of
Oregon, and At. and Al. Wood Working Company, Plylock Corp., Cir. Ct., Multnomah
Cty., Oct. 14, 1938.
1940]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49: 461
if strikers are replaced immediately, there is no "stoppage of work,""'8
The main stumbling block lies in ascertaining what degree of curtailment
of operations constitutes a stoppage. Stoppages have been held to exist
where seven out of fifty-five men were on strike ;13 where operations were
resumed with three-fourths the normal crew;14 where there was a 20%
decrease in production ;141 where the plant operated on one shift instead
of the usual two;14 where the union prevented resumption of work
after the slack season ;143 where normal production was maintained only
by utilizing emergency resources.144 On the other hand, it has be~n held
that no stoppage existed where 40-50% of the workers continued to
work 45 or where production decreased only 15 .146 The termination
of a stoppage occurs when there is a general resumption of work, although
picketing may continue. 47
DUE TO LABOR DISPUTE
The decisions dealing with the causal relationship between the labor
dispute and the loss of employment or stoppage of work bpar all the
earmarks of the metaphysical torts nemesis: when does an intervening
force break the chain of proximate cause?
The stoppage of work must be due to the dispute. If operations would
have ceased in any event, because of economic conditions or the advent
of the slack season, no disqualification is applied despite the obvious
existence of a labor dispute. 4 s And when the stoppage is no longer due
to the dispute but to economic conditions, loss of contracts, cancellation
138. Conn., Dec. of Comm'r No. 473-A-38 (Nov. 16, 1938).
139. N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-15 L (1939) (work of strikers found to have caused appre-
ciable reduction in the total output).
140. Ore. Referee's Dec. No. 38-RA-149 (June 1, 1938).
141. N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-65 L (1939).
142. N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-12L (1939) ; Ore. Referee's Dec. No. 38-RA-126 (Apr. 19,1938).
143. N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-52L (1939).
144. N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-44 L (1939) (work customarily performed in plant was
diverted to another establishment) ; N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-33 L (1939) (officer of corpora-
tion and his three brothers manned the trucks); Ore., Referee's Dec. No. 38-RA-109
(March 25, 1938) (remaining employees were employed for longer hours).
145. N. C. Dec. of Comm. No. 6 (Sept. 2, 1938).
146. N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-91 L (June 12, 1939).
147. Mich. Referee's Dec. AB-1585 (1939); N. D. App. Trib. App. No. 6 (Oct. 27,
1939).
148. E.g., continued maintenance of a picket line: Conn. Dec. of Comm'r No. 2-A-38
(Feb. 18, 1938) and No. 425-A-38 (Aug. 11, 1938); Ind. App. Trib. 39-LD-25 and
39-LD-38 (1939); Ore.: Referee's Dec. No. 38-RA-298 (Dec. 31, 1938) and Dec, of
Comm. No. 39-C-14 (May 22, 1939). Similarly, where an employer, in anticipation of a
strike, stepped up production to such an extent that at the time fixed for the strike,
further production was impossible; held, cessation of work not due to labor dispute. Ind.
Bd. Rev. No. 39-LDR-5 (Nov. 18, 1939).
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of orders or liquidation of the business by the employer, disqualification
is lifted.149
In addition, the loss of employment must be due to the labor dispute.
Where they occur simultaneously, a presumption of a causal relationship
is raised. But where it is established that the loss of employment was
for reasons independent of the dispute, there is no disqualification despite
their concurrence in point of time.' There is one exception to this
principle; a layoff for reasons independent of a dispute may result in
disqualification when that layoff is itself the subject of a dispute.'
Another situation arises where the claimant was temporarily laid off prior
to the dispute and was unable to return to work because of the inter-
vening strike. Although opinion is divided, the prevailing view is that
a temporary layoff does not sever the employer-employee relationship
and therefore inability to return to work because of a subsequent strike
may be interpreted as loss of employment due to the dispute. 5 - When
149. Ind. App. Trib. No. 39-LD-13 (March 31, 1939); N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-9 L (1939);
Ore.: Ref. Dec. No. 38-RA-116 (1938).
150. N. Y. Referee's Dec. No. 535-270-38R (Oct. 21, 193S) (claimant's work ceased
because of slack season) ; N. Y. App. Bd. 577-39 (April 4, 1939) (decline in volume of
business).
151. N. Y. App. Bd. 236-38 (Oct. 3, 1938). The employer sought to have the em-
ployees submit to a two-day lay off without pay because of insufficient work. The
union refused his request on the ground that there was no lack of work. Thereupon
fourteen men were laid off and the remainder of the employees walked out in protest. All
the claimants were disqualified, the Board stating that the contention that their unem-
ployment wmas due to lack of work was based upon, and assumed, the truth of a question
which was the subject of a controversy.
152. "It is the claimant's contention that he was laid off on May 27 because of lad:
of work, and that this layoff and not the strike w.-as the cause of his loss of employment
within the meaning of Section 5042 (b) of the Labor Law . . . We believe that loss of
employment as used in the foregoing Section means more than a temporary layoff of a
fixed duration. There must be some tangible evidence of a complete severance of the
relationship of employer and employee . . . where a claimant is absent from his employ-
ment for a temporary period which is of a fixed duration, and a strike intervenes vhich
prevents his return to his employment, he must be deemed to have lost his employment
on the day on which he would have returned." N. Y. App. Bd. 222-38 (Oct. 11, 1933). A
similar decision, 229-38 (1938) was affirmed on appeal, Matter of Sadowski, 257 App.
Div. 529 (3d Dep't 1939). Conn. Dec. of Comm'r No. 17-C-38 (Mar. 1, 1933) and 391-
A-38 (Aug. 26, 1938) and 462-A-38 (Apr. 15, 1939); Mich. App. Bd. AB-215-34 (Jan.
26, 1939) ; N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-52L (1939) ; Wis. App. Trib., No. 38-A-6S (Feb., 1938).
Contra: Ind. App. Trib. 39-LD-6, 7, 9, 10, 11 (1939) ; Ore. Referee's Dec. No. 3S-RA-111
(April 8, 1938).
An indefinite, as distinguished from a temporary, layoff has been held to sever the
employer-employee relationship so that no disqualification results from a subsequnt
strike. Calif. Referee's Trib. R-44-163-33 (Dec. 8, 1938); Mass. Dep't App. 33-A-3
(Dec. 28, 1938) ; Ga. App. Trib., Nos. 274 and 275 (Sept. 20, 1939) ; Minn. App. Trib.,
No. 845 (Nov. 4, 1939); N. D. App. Trib., No. 10 (Sept. 27, 1939); Wis. App. Trib.,
Nos. 38-A-351, 352, 353, 359 (1938).
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the dispute is settled, the unemployment of persons not immediately
called back to work is no longer subject to disqualification. 58
DIRECTLY INVOLVED
Much of the adjudication of the administrative agencies has been
devoted to interpreting and applying the provisions in the 40-odd statutes
which attempt to confine disqualification to workers actually connected
with the dispute. The bulk of these cases deal with whether the claimant
is (1) participating in, (2) financing, or (3) directly interested in the
labor dispute; whether he was a member of a grade or class of workers
which took such a part; and whether the stoppage occurred at the estab-
lishment where he was employed.' 54
Participation in the labor dispute may be inferred either from the
claimant's status as a union member or from his own activity. Mere
membership in the striking union has been held to be conclusive evidence
of participation.' It is then immaterial whether the claimant voted
against the strike or took no steps to support it.' It is also of no con-
sequence that he does not pay dues or attend meetings, as long as lie is
still considered a member. 57 The rationale of this attitude is that by
joining a union each member consents to be bound by its acts in dealing
with the employer. In fact, this collective responsibility was extended
in one case to membership in a union affiliated with a central labor council
which supported a strike on the part of a second union.'58 Other states
have established the principle that membership in the striking union is
merely presumptive evidence of participation, but the practical results
in specific applications are indistinguishable.'
Though not a member of the striking union, a claimant may "partici-
pate" in the labor dispute by taking some affirmative action. Usually this
involves voluntarily declining to pass a picket line around the establish-
153. Ind. App. Trib. 39-LD-5 (March 31, 1939). See Georgia Unempl. Comp. Law,
§ 5 (d) (2); So. Car.: Legal Rulings of Gen'l Counsel, Q-16, C. C. H. Unempl, Ins.
Serv. (S.C.) g8029.16 (1938).
154. See note 4 supra.
155. Ind. App. Trib. 39-LD-27 (1939).
156. Ga. App. Trib., No. 336 (Nov. 22, 1939); Ind. App. Trib. 39-LD-5 (March 31,
1939) ; Pa. Bd. Rev., B-44-4-A-535 (May 12, 1939).
157. Ibid.
158. N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-36 L (1939).
159. "While mere membership in a disputant union is not conclusive evidence of par-
ticipation . . . a union member is held to be participating in a dispute if he fails to show
otherwise . . . If a union, through its representatives acting within the scope of their
authority, decides to 'support' a strike, all members of the union are participating."
N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-36 L (1939); Mich. App. Bd. 215-34, (1939) (presumably all men-
bers of union which calls and conducts the strike are affected by outcome and must be
held to be directly interested and involved in the strike).
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ment."'0 Or, he may himself join the picket line after having been laid
off because of lack of work due to a strike by other employees."" The
motive for such behavior is of no consequence, as is illustrated by an
amusing Mkichigan case where a non-union claimant opposed to the strike
confessed that he was picketing solely because the striking union was
distributing free sandwiches to pickets.112  Nor is it necessary for a
"participating" claimant to be active in behalf of the striking union. He
may be included in the same category if he assists a company-organized
back-to-work movement, even though he was not a member of the back-
to-work league and merely signed a certificate indicating it as his choice
for bargaining agent. 3 This is on the theory that the effect of such an
organization may be to furnish an excuse to the company to break off
negotiations with the bona fide union and to prolong the dispute by
stiffening the company's resistance to immediate settlement.
The likelihood is that most "non-participating" claimants will still be
subject to disqualification because they are "directly interested" in the
outcome of the labor dispute. For a claimant to be "directly interested,"
it is ordinarily necessary only that his wages, hours or conditions of work
will be affected, favorably or adversely, by the outcome,'" or that a
dispute as to representation include his occupation." It is usually imnia-
terial that such interest be wholly involuntary; the principle applies even
if a picket line forcibly prevents him from working. 0 0
"Financing" is really but a subdivision of "participating," and there-
fore of slight practical consequence. Two statutes specifically provide
that mere payment of union dues shall not constitute "financing,"' 0 GT but
their effect is unimportant as long as union membership is regarded as
so intimately connected with "participation." In the only case which
has thus far arisen solely on the specific "financing" issue, members of
a union not interested or participating in a dispute between a second union
and the employer, but which had contributed $25 to the strikers, were
disqualified.0 8
160. Cal. Referee's Dec. R-13-114-39 (Jan. 11, 1939); Ore. Referee's Dec. 39-RA-
171 (June 30, 1938) and 38-RA-279 (Oct. 1, 193); 'Wash. App. Trib., Docket No. A-64
(No%. 30, 1939). Cf. Ind. App. Trib. 39-LD-53 (Nov. 3, 1939).
161. R. I. Deputy's Dec. No. 7 (Mar. 24, 1939).
162. Mich. Referee's Dec. AB-513 (1939).
163. ich. Referee's Dec. AB-1148 (Apr. 27, 1939).
164. Conn. Dec. of Comm'r, 381-A-38 (Sept. 6. 1938); Dist. of Col.: Opinion of
Corp. Counsel, No. 140 (May 23, 1939); Ind. App. Trib. 39-LD-39 (1939); Mich. Ref-
eree's Dec. AB-909 (1939).
165. Ore.: Dec. of Comm. 39-C-5 (Apr. 19, 1939).
166. N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-1 (1939). Bit see Ga. App. Nos. 233 and 291 (Oct. 4, 1939)
(claimant could not safely cross picket line; claim allowed because he was nonunion and
he stated that he was satisfied with conditions as they were before the strike, although
other employees in the same department were members of the union and were on strike).
167. Florida, § 6D(1); Michigan. §29(d) (2).
16S. Conn. Dec. of Comm'r, 357-A-38 (Aug. 3, 1938).
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A claimant who has satisfied the above conditions has not yet run the
entire length of the gauntlet. He must still show that he does not belong
to a "grade or class of workers" any member of which was participating
in, financing, or directly interested in the dispute. For this determina-
tion, homogeneity of interest is the general test, but, like determining an
appropriate bargaining unit under the NLRA, each case must be decided
on its own peculiar facts. A maintenance man and millworkers may be
considered to be of the same grade or class because of interdependence
of terms and conditions of employment ;109 but not photo-engravers and
editorial employees.-" And the test of eligibility in the same union would
group together fixture workers and those engaged in sash and door
work, 71 but not the clerical staff and production workers.1 2
A similar problem is involved in determining whether the labor dispute
is at the establishment where the claimant is or was last employed. Where
independent businesses are involved, there is no question that separate
establishments exist. For example, a shutdown of firm A because of
inability to get materials from firm B does not disqualify the employees
in firm A.17 1 Similarly, employees of a subcontractor in the same premises
as the contractor would not be disqualified because they refused to pass
a picket line before the premises because of a strike involving the con-
tractor. 174 Different establishments have been found even where cor-
porations have interlocking officers and are functionally coordinated.1"
Less clear-cut are the cases involving different plants of the same
employer. The tests of "functional integrality" and "physical proximity"
are said to apply to different plants.17 ' Thus a clerk in a company store
would not be disqualified if the store were closed because of a strike in
the company mill ;177 but the parts and services building might be con-
sidered functionally integrated with four other buildings about, five
hundred feet away. . Similarly, plants in different states, or even in
different cities, would be regarded as separate establishments.170
169. Ore: Dec. of Comm., 39-C-5 (Apr. 19, 1939).
170. Minn. App. Trib., No. 285 (Feb. 28, 1939).
171. Minn. App. Trib., No. 157 (Dec. 9, 1938).
172. N. C. Dec. of Comm., No. 5 (July 26, 1938). However, mere nonmembership in
the striking union does not preclude the claimant from being considered in the same grade
or class. Mass. Bd. Rev. 39-A-345 (Oct. 24, 1939) and 39-A-394 (Nov. 6, 1939).
173. Calif. Referee's Dec. R-29-119-38 (Oct. 21, 1938); N. J. Bd. Rev. BR-59L
(1939); N. Y. Referee's Dec. M40-4-38R (Mar. 1, 1938).
174. N. Y. Referee's Dec. 511-116-38R (Oct. 4, 1938).
175. Wis. App. Trib. 38-A-484 (Oct., 1938).
176. Wis. App. Trib. 38-A-484 (Oct:, 1938).
177. S. C. Opinion of Counsel, Legal No. 93 (Feb. 10, 1939).
178. Wis. App. Trib. 37-A-34 (1937).




Finally, disqualification is lifted if a claimant becomes bona fide em-
ployed elsewhere. The employment must not be makeshift, or taken for
the purpose of circumventing the disqualifying provision.1 O A day or
two of work provided by a relative as lawn cutter or handyman, when
such is not the claimant's usual occupation,' s ' or a job at a wage much
lower than that normally earned,18 2 provides no escape from disquali-
fication because it does not negate the presumption that, if the dispute
were over, the claimant would return to his former employment.
CONCLUSION
This Article has been intended neither as a complete compendium of
all contested "labor dispute" claims nor as a critical barrage directed
against particular decisions. Its chief purpose, rather, has been to indicate
that the task of administering labor dispute disqualification clauses has
proved to be infinitely more burdensome and complex than the legislators
could possibly have envisaged. This alone is no condemnation. Though
promptness is desirable, any effective administrative process must at times
seem ponderous in laboriously applying flexible criteria to individual
situations; and "hard" cases always lie strewn in its wake. But in ad-
ministering unemployment compensation systems, speed is not only desir-
able but essential. Unless benefits are promptly paid, the system will be
utterly ineffectual in relieving the distress of the unemployed and in
attempting to maintain purchasing power. Protracted hearings, tardy
decisions and time-consuming appeals prevent attainment of these pur-
poses.""3 Concededly, the price would be worth paying if the reasons
for disqualifying all claimants associated with a labor dispute were pre-
eminently persuasive. But, we have seen, they are not.
What, then, is the solution? We urge a simple and direct one: the:
labor dispute disqualification clauses should be repealed.
1M0. Cal. Unempl. Res. Comm., Rules & Regulations Section, Code No. B 1356a-02
(1939); Oregon, Ref. Dec. 38-RA-155 (June 1, 1938); S. C.: Op. Unempl. Comp.
Comm. General Counsel, Legal No. 85 (Oct. 21, 1938).
181. N.Y. Referee's Dec. 524-4-39R (Jan. 14,1939) and 532-367-39R (Oct. 14, 1939).
182. Conn.: Op. Att'y Gen'l (Sept. 30, 1937).
183. Cf. Cloe, supra note 45, at 1153 ct seq.
Inadequate data and inconstant factors make it impossible to compute the precise
average time length of an appealed decision. Decisions usually omit relevant dates. Pro-
cedures are usually in a constant state of flux in an effort to achieve simplification. And
sometimes, where inertia and budgetary obstacles can be surmounted, an attempt is made
to lessen the backlog by correcting the understaffing. Nevertheless, it may be conserva-
tively estimated that the time from the first appeal agency to the second usually.runs into
months. When courts become involved, the period may seem interminable--e.g., eight
months after the stoppage of work during the bituminous coal negotiations, appeals are
still pending in some of the courts. Even if the claimant has been successful before the
final administrative agency, an appeal to a court would further delay payment, e.g, for
four months in the Oio aMiners' case. See note 30, supra.
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Lest this suggestion be considered merely a flippant gesture, some of
the hazards confronting any attempt at piecemeal reform, whether by
legislation or by administrative interpretation, may be indicated. Four
plausible lines of reform are available: (1) the definition of "labor
dispute" might be considerably narrowed, especially by excluding lock-
outs, stoppages of work during peaceful negotiations and secondary boy-
cotts; (2) the "participating" and "directly interested" clauses might be
drawn so as to disqualify fewer workers; (3) more consideration might
be given to the merits of the dispute, as in the Arizona, Montana and
Utah statutes; and (4) a short maximum period of disqualification, in
addition to the normal waiting period, might be set, as in Pennsylvania.
However, none of these suggestions, singly or in combination, would
afford a satisfactory solution. Narrowing the definition of "labor dis-
pute," though justifiable theoretically, might afford alluring precedents
for judges interested in emasculating anti-injunction legislation. It
would also involve practical difficulties, already mentioned, 8 4 for place-
ment agencies. The suggestion that fewer workers be considered directly
involved in the labor dispute is attractive in the sense that it increases
the number eligible for benefits. But it is undesirable in that its effect
would be to discourage or penalize those workers who take forthright
action.' 85 An inquiry into the merits would have the advantage of elimin-
ating some of the present inequities, but only at the expense of further
retarding the process of administration and projecting the administrators
into fields reserved for others better qualified. Reduction of the period
of disqualification would be closest, it is true, to outright repeal. But it
would not lessen the administrative burden; it would be arbitrary; and
it would, of course, ignore the arguments against any disqualification.
It would be a grievous misconception, however, to imagine that repeal
of labor dispute disqualification clauses would encourage, or even coun-
tenance, on the part of labor any activity which is condemned by pre-
vailing standards. Claimants who are unemployed because of a labor
dispute would, of course, still be subject to the regular waiting periods
184. See p. 475 supra.
185. This is graphically illustrated by the Question and Answer Summary of Texas
UnempI. Comp. Law, Revised, April 19, 1937. Release of Tex. Unempl. Comp. Comm.
Q. 13: "A previous article said that strikers cannot draw benefits under this Act.
Suppose I leave my job as a result of a strike at my factory, although I personally had
nothing to do with the strike. Will I be ineligible for benefits?
A.: No. But you must be able to prove to authorities that you had no part in the labor
dispute.
You must show that you were not taking part in, or helping to finance, or directly
interested in the labor dispute which stopped the work.
If you belong to a labor union or group, and other members of that union are inter-
ested in the dispute, then you will be considered to have a direct interest in it." C. C. H.
Unempl. Ins. Serv. (Tex.) 8004.13.
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and would receive benefits far less than their wages. Anyone foolhardy
enough to provoke a labor dispute in the hope of thriving on this meagre
pittance would be subject to disqualification if he subsequently refused
suitable employment. The penalties for misconduct would still be appli-
cable; and, in appropriate circumstances, this might include illegal sit-
down strikes or violence. In short, unemployment compensation without
labor dispute disqualification clauses would relieve unemployment without
being either an incentive or a deterrent to customary forms of labor
activity.
APPENDIX
Statutes Modelcd after Social Security Draft Bill
(Modifications noted in parentheses)
ALASKA E§ 5d] (8-wk. maximum disqualification; omits "financing"; "labor dispute
in active progress" instead of "stoppage of work because of labor dispute"); AnizoN,
[§ 5 (4)] ("labor dispute, strike or lockout"; investigation into merits, see note S supra) ;
ARKAN AS [§5(d)]; COLopao [§5(d)] ("strike"): CoNNEc'rxctrr [§ S0d(b) (3)]
("trade, class or organization" ; omits "separate branches" clause); FLonr. [§ 6D] (adds
"the payment of regular union dues shall not be construed as financing a labor dispute") ;
GEORGIA [§5(d)]; HAWAiI [§ 5(d)]; IDAHO [§ 5(e)] ("a then existing labor dispute"
instead of "stoppage of work because of labor dispute") ; Iu.LoIS [§ 7(d)]; I:DMIANA
[§ 6 f(3)] (adds clause on sympathetic strikes); Iowa [§ 5 (d)]; KANsAs [§ 44-705(d)];
LouisIANA C§4(d)] (ten weeks maximum disqualification; omits "financing"); M Ann
[§ 5(d)]; MARYLAND [§ 5(d)]; MAssAcHUsLrTs [§ 16(b)]; MIzCc iN § 29(d)]
("labor dispute which is actively in progress" instead of "stoppage of work .. because
of a labor dispute"; adds "the payment of regular union dues shall not be construed as
financing a labor dispute . . ."; slightly different tests for "directly involved," including
sympathy strike but omitting "separate branches" clause); Mrnmsor, [§ 7 E (omits
"directly interested") ; Mississippi C§ 5(d)] (omits "financing") ; Missouni [§ 10 11(a)I
(adds: subsequent employment must last at least 3 weeks to terminate disqualification) ;
MONTANA [§ 5(d)] (investigation into merits, see note 8 supra); NEMrLsN-A [§ 5(d)];
NEVADA [§ 5 (d)] ; Nv HAmpSHRE [§ 4D]; NEW JEmsEY [ 43:21-5 (d)]; Nzvw Mxico
[§5(d)]; NORTH CAROLINA [§5(d)]; NORTH DAkoTA [§7(d)]; OrLAnOn!A [§5(d)]
(omits "stoppage of work which exists because of') ; OREGoo [§ 5(e)] ("labor dispute
which is in active progress" instead of "stoppage of work which exists because of a labr
dispute"); RHODE ISLAND [§ 7(4)] (different phraseology; 8 weeks plus waiting pericd
maximum; no "separate branches" clause; "strike or other industrial controversy" instead
of "labor dispute"; "organization or group responsible for stoppage" instead of "grade or
class" clause); SoUTH CAROLINA E§5(d)] ("directly due to labor dispute in active
progress" instead of "stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute") ; SoUTH
DAKOTA [§17.0830(4)1; TE-NssEE [§5(d)] (4 weeks maximum; labor dispute "in
active progress" instead of "stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute") ;
TE X s [§ 5(d)] ("benefit period" instead of "week") ; VER.1ONT [U 5(d)] (omits "grade
or class" and "separate branches" clauses) ; VirG1N M 5(d)]; "VAs.mG:To [1§5(e)];
WEST VIRGINIA [§4(4)] (omits "separate branches" clause); Wy'our-n [§ 5(d)].
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